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Abstract  
Despite the considerable growth of Information Systems (IS) outsourcing in recent years, this trend is 
still the object of strong criticism. This study has as its aim to show the main risks computer 
outsourcing entails for the largest Spanish firms. In order to achieve that aim, we have reviewed the 
previous literature on this topic and later analysed the results of a survey covering 5,000 firms.  
According to the firms under analysis, the main concern in relation to IS outsourcing is the excessive 
dependence on the provider this type of contract may generate. Nevertheless, some characteristics of 
firms (mainly their size) somehow determine what risks are seen as the most relevant. The conclusions 
also suggest that total outsourcing can turn out to be a very dangerous strategy, mainly due to the 
dependence it creates. This is why IS managers should consider other alternatives such as having 
multiple providers or resorting to selective outsourcing. 
Keywords:  Management of IS, Outsourcing, Risks, Survey. 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Information Systems (IS) outsourcing has experienced a remarkable growth in recent years (Baldwing, 
Irani and Love, 2001:16; Currie, 2000:241; Kern, Willcocks and Van Heck, 2002:47; Lacity and 
Willcocks, 1998:363; Marchand and Jacobsen, 2001:315; McLellan, Marcolin and Beamish, 
1995:300; Palvia, 1995:265; Shepherd, 1999:64; Udo, 2000:422); some authors even suggest we find 
ourselves in the Outsourcing Era (King, 2001:15) and, judging by the forecast data offered by some 
computer market analysts, this growth will continue in the near future (The Yankee Group, 2003).  
These services are not only growing, but also spreading geographically, from North America, the 
United Kingdom and Australia to Western Europe, South America and some countries in Southeast 
Asia, like Japan (Moran, 1999:1). What is more, the scope and range of services being outsourced are 
increasing too (Currie, 1998:169), as is shown by the promotion of BPO (Business Process 
Outsourcing), ASP (Applications Service Providers), Global Outsourcing, Web and E-business 
Outsourcing. 
However, the unique nature of Information Technology (IT) places customers in a position of 
disadvantage with respect to IS outsourcing providers (Lacity and Willcocks; 1995:226-228). 
Customers often lack experience in the signature of outsourcing contracts. This is not the case for 
providers (Ketler and Walstrom; 1993:457), who enjoy a much better position due to this information 
asymmetry. 
This is why the present paper seeks to identify the risks perceived to be the most relevant in IS 
outsourcing, from the customer’s point of view. With that aim in mind, we will firstly review the 
literature on IS outsourcing risks, after which we will show the methodology, the main results and the 
conclusions of an empirical piece of work based on a survey carried out among the IS managers of the 
largest Spanish firms. The results will not only tell us the level of importance of the said risks in the 
firms under analysis, but also will help us to try and determine whether or not those risks are 
conditioned by the outsourcing level or the diverse characteristics of firms (like sector and size) and 
their IS departments. 
2 OUTSOURCING RISKS IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS LITERATURE 
IS outsourcing is a managerial decision that entails various risks and problems, so much so that 
numerous authors have identified an associated risk for each advantage suggested. Firstly, we can 
encounter problems derived from the dependence this service generates. The dependence results from 
the fact that, in practice, firms find it difficult to quantify and define the information services they 
need, and besides, those services tend to evolve over time. Therefore, if these services had not been 
agreed in the original contract, they would have to be charged with an additional rate, thus increasing 
the total costs (Fowler and Jeffs, 1998:121); or internal improvements in the customer firm’s IS might 
be neglected (Glass, 1996:90). This is why Lacity and Hirschheim (1993b:76) state that external 
providers are not strategic partners, as the interest in profits is not shared; in other words, when the 
customer’s costs increase, the same happens to the provider’s profits. Along the same lines, Guterl 
(1996:80) suggests that providers would rather customers had more additional costs, not fewer. 
The loss of critical skills and competences is another relevant problem. When a service is outsourced, the 
customer loses his understanding of the service over time. Even though the provider supplies innovative 
services to the customer, a large part of the new knowledge required remains in the hands of the provider 
and cannot be transferred to the customer. Worse than that, the firm can lose its capacity to be up to date 
with technological breakthroughs (Clark, Zmud and McCray, 1995:231). Therefore, the customer needs to 
retain certain know-how and internal capacities in both technical and managerial areas so as to be able to 
handle the outsourcing relationship properly (Willcocks and Lacity, 1999:177). Retaining these capacities 
is the best way to identify and evaluate potential outsourcing risks and also to perform practices that can 
mitigate those risks (Willcocks, Lacity and Kern, 1999:310). 
An additional difficulty has to do with the qualification of the provider’s staff’s. Although in theory 
outsourcing provides access to technical knowledge and IS specialists’ expertise, what very often 
happens in practice is that the firm which outsources is supported by the same staff as before (Fowler 
and Jeffs, 1998:122; Glass, 1996:89), as these staff have been transferred from the customer firm to 
the service providing firm. Lacity and Hirschheim (1993b:78) warn that many of the outsourcing firms 
feel they have suffered losses in business knowledge and experience, because providers send their 
most qualified workers to get new customers from other firms in the sector once they have achieved 
the contract. Besides, providers hardly ever take the initiative when it comes to business strategies; 
they prefer to follow specific instructions instead. 
The provider’s lack of compliance with the contract is another possible risk. This problem is inherent 
to any contract: whenever an agent performs tasks for a principal, the principal always runs the risk of 
the agent not completing the task as expected or of being less vigilant than the principal would be 
(Clark, Zmud and McCray, 1995:230). Besides, in the case of IS outsourcing, customers’ needs may 
not be properly met, and an inadequate task priority may be established, above all because the provider 
does not fully understand what the business is all about (Martinsons, 1993:21; Glass, 1996:90). 
What is more, an unclear cost-benefit relationship may exist within IS outsourcing; after all, 
performing a cost/benefit analysis for outsourcing is no easy matter. Taking into account all relevant 
factors and translating them into monetary values is not easy either. For example, some issues include 
determining how to compare and translate the potentially better service of an outsourcing vendor with 
the service provided by the internal IS department and deciding how to measure in economic terms the 
consequences of an outsourcing vendor failing to deliver products or delivering unacceptable products 
(Gupta and Gupta, 1992:49). Before these difficulties, many firms admit that their decision to 
outsource is only based on the costs of outsourcing, and not on its benefits (Clark, Zmud and McCray, 
1995:230), seeing as costs exclusively those fixed in the contract. 
Although one of the main theoretical objectives of outsourcing is to control IS costs or flexibilise them 
by making them become variable, outsourcing may have hidden costs, such as those derived from 
dismissing or transferring staff, the transfer of licences by software vendors, etc. These costs are 
mainly due to ambiguities in the contract, i.e. failing to define present and future IT requirements; 
applying poor recruitment practices; not allowing providers to obtain reasonable profits and being 
unable to create mechanisms that protect prices in case of contingency (Willcocks, Lacity and 
Fitzgerald, 1995:339). Summing up, the hidden costs of outsourcing could be the following 
(Barthélemy; 2001:61-66): a) vendor search and contracting - many enterprises underestimate the 
expense associated with identifying and evaluating suitable IT vendors, selecting a finalist, and  
negotiating as well as drafting the contract, b) transitioning to the vendor – it can take months before 
the vendor knows as much as the internal IT department, c) costs related to provider management - 
which imply, amongst other things, verifying that IT vendors fulfil their contractual obligations, 
bargaining with them, and finally, negotiating any contract changes required, and d) transition costs 
after outsourcing – these costs come from switching vendors or resuming IT activities internally. 
We should mention possible security issues, above all when a provider has to serve several direct 
competitors, which means having to keep confidentiality about the information corresponding to all of 
them (Grover, Cheon and Teng, 1994:38; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a:24). The security of the IS 
services outsourced will depend on the providing firm, which is why policies and procedures must be 
negotiated within the outsourcing contract to ensure that IS security objectives (effectiveness, 
efficiency, adequacy, integrity, validity, authorisation, privacy) continue to be fulfilled (Fink, 1994:5). 
Another risk is the oft-mentioned irreversibility of the outsourcing decision (Fink, 1994:5), especially 
if the user has got rid of the technical and human infrastructure needed to reconstruct his IS in house 
(Barthélemy, 2001:67; Fowler and Jeffs, 1998:121). There are three main reasons for this 
irreversibility: the high costs involved in reconstructing the IS department, the difficulty to attract the 
necessary staff and the amount of time required (Clark, Zmud and McCray, 1995:231). 
Outsourcing generates various staff-related problems; the customer firm will therefore meet the 
possible opposition of the IS staff, who see outsourcing as a threat to their working position. IS staff 
may find themselves before a dismissal, a retraining period, or a transfer to the service providing firm 
(Grover, Cheon and Teng, 1994:38). This uncertain situation creates anxiety and a feeling of 
insecurity, which may result in a decrease of employees’ productivity during the period prior to the 
signature of the contract or even after the contract has been signed (Palvia, 1995:270). 
When only some staff members are transferred from the customer firm to the provider firm, it has been 
checked that problems related to lack of motivation arise among those staying in the customer firm. 
These professionals probably feel offended because they think they are not good enough to belong to a 
specialist firm like the computer service provider (Willcocks and Fitzgerald, 1996:287). On the other 
hand, those who are transferred from one firm to another may suffer various changes that can go from 
their seniority or any other favourable condition to the need to adapt to a new corporate culture. The status 
of the IT executives who remain in the customer firm usually improves (Martinsons, 1993:21), but they 
must reorient their competence (Corbett; 1994:20-21), focussing on external relationships management 
and dedicating much less time to operations management.  
Finally, we can refer to the inability to adapt to new technologies. In theory, access to leading-edge 
technology is a persuasive argument in support of IS outsourcing, as a firm can enjoy the latest 
technology without the lead time that is customary for in-house development (Palvia, 1995:269). 
Outsourcing vendors can quickly adapt to machine upgrades and new software releases (Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1993.a:20). In practice, though, if providers do not find benefits in the adoption of new 
technologies, they could become reluctant to adopt them, in an attempt to make the service they offer 
as profitable as possible. What is more, if the outsourcing contract does not include a clause relative to 
the future technological evolution, that evolution will not be completed (Glass, 1996:90). 
All these risks will become greater if customers opt for total outsourcing. Therefore, IS managers 
should consider other alternatives such as resorting to selective outsourcing or outsourcing with 
multiple providers (Currie, 1998:171). With selective outsourcing, firms can retain the internal knowledge 
required to handle the outsourcing provider or even to revert the outsourcing process. With the option of 
multiple providers, the customer firm can negotiate outsourcing contracts with multiple providers 
differentiated by competence, experience and market position (Cross, 1995:96), thus making the different 
providers’ skills complementary. However, even these strategies have their risks; Cross (1995:96), for 
instance, points out that it is difficult to manage and coordinate the work of several providers. In turn, Loh 
and Venkatraman (1992:11) suggest that it is not easy to specify each provider’s responsibilities either, 
especially when the outsourced processes are interdependent. Finally, Currie and Willcocks (1998:141) 
reminds us that the management and coordination of multiple contracts are very time-consuming.   
Other practices that would surely help to reduce risks have to do with fully understanding the nature of 
the work outsourced, signing short-term contracts, demanding up-to-date documentation about those 
contracts and also with the customer’s ability to retain the skills and competences needed to ensure 
that contracts  add value to profits (Earl, 1996:24; Currie, 1998:179, Hurst and Hanessian; 1995:107). 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
After identifying IS outsourcing risks in the literature, we will explore how these risks apply to the 
largest Spanish firms. The reason why we decided that our target population should be formed by the 
largest firms was that, in the absence of previous data about IS outsourcing in Spain, those large firms 
could be expected to have accumulated more knowledge and experience in this field. This reason is 
similar to the one provided by Fink and Shoeib (2003:305) in their paper. In order to identify the 
largest firms, we used the directory Las 5.000 mayores empresas (The 5,000 largest firms) of 
Actualidad Económica magazine, which has been collated with other databases largely used in  
business studies like Duns and Bradstreet’s 50.000 Principales Empresas Españolas (the 50,000 main 
Spanish firms). Among the 5,000 Spanish firms with the highest sales, we looked up on the list of the 
first database those which shared the same telephone number and address, as this was a symptom 
revealing that both the IS manager and the structure itself could coincide. Once that information was 
known to us, we decided to send the questionnaire only to the firm which, having the same telephone 
number and address as others, had the highest sales. 
In this way, we eliminated 584 firms, after which our final database consisted of 4,416 firms, to which 
was sent a questionnaire along with a stamped addressed envelope for the questionnaire to be returned. 
We had to face the handicap that field studies based on surveys about IS outsourcing do not 
proliferate, case studies being more common (Aubert, Rivard and Patry; 1996; Baldwing, Irani and 
Love, 2001; Huber, 1993; Kern and Willcocks, 2000; 2002; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a; 1993b; 
Lacity and Willcocks, 1997; Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny, 1996; Loebbecke and Jelassi, 1999; 
McLellan, Marcolin and Beamish, 1995; Palvia, 1995; Willcocks and Choi, 1995; Willcocks, 
Fitzgerald and Lacity, 1996; Willcocks, Lacity and Kern, 1999). However, on the basis of the previous 
literature about this matter, we prepared a questionnaire draft, which was later subjected to a pilot test 
and a pre-test. 5 out of the 19 questions in the final questionnaire were used in this study, as this paper 
is part of a larger empirical study dealing with a wide range of aspects related to IS outsourcing. The 
questionnaire’s addressees were the IS managers of the firms included in the final database.  
The information obtained through the questionnaire was later elaborated on using the statistical 
program SPSS for Windows and then treated with univariant and multivariant statistical methods. 
Table 1 shows the study specifications, where we can see that 357 valid answers were obtained, i.e. an 
8%. This percentage is acceptable if we bear in mind that obtaining answers in surveys carried out 
among IS executives is problematic. This is due to the fact that the rapid technological change, the 
considerable investments firms have made on IT, and the great interest aroused by outsourcing have 
made these executives become the target of many surveys (Poppo and Zenger, 1998:862). 
 
Scope Spain 
Population 4,416 largest Spanish businesses (by sales) 
Sample size 357 valid answers (8%) 
Sampling error 5% 
Survey date June-October, 2001 
Table 1. Study technical specifications. 
4 RESULTS 
As for the presentation of the results obtained in the empirical study, we will firstly refer to some 
general features of firms, such as their outsourcing level or the size and characteristics of their IS 
department. This will allow us to check, in the following subsection, what risks are involved in 
outsourcing, and whether or not those risks are influenced by the said features.  
4.1 General characteristics of firms 
IS outsourcing is undoubtedly a widespread phenomenon, since only 14.3% of the interviewed firms 
have outsourced no IS services (Table 2). The outsourcing level variable will help us to check if the  
higher or lower outsourcing level of firms conditions their decision to outsource IS services. An even 
distribution of firms with outsourcing levels above and below the mean is possible thanks to the way 
in which this variable was designed. 
The size of a firm can be measured by the number of employees and its sales. Table 2 shows that the 
interviewed firms are large with respect to these two variables, since the lowest percentages are found 
in the smallest firms (only 6.2 % of them have between 0 and 50 employees and 10.1% turn over up to 
5 billion pesetas, ca. 30 million €.). Most of the interviewed firms belong to the Industrial sector 
(58.8%), followed by the Service sector with one third of the firms. We have detected that 8.1% of the 
answers came from firms belonging to the Financial and Insurance Institutions sector. 
 
  N % 
No 51 14.3Outsourcing Yes 306 85.7
Below the mean 175 49.0Outsourcing Level Above the mean 182 51.0
0-50 22 6.2
51-500 202 56.6
More than 500 132 36.9Staff 
Lost 1 0.3
Up to 5 36 10.1
More than 5 up to 50 227 63.6





Services 118 33.1Sector 
Financial and insurance institutions 29 8.1
1-10 Employees 240 67.2
11-100 Employees 96 26.9






allocated to IS 
Lost 145 40.6
* 1€ is 166.386 pesetas 
Table 2. General characteristics of firms. 
Despite the size of firms, IS departments do not have a large staff volume. As is shown in Table 2, 
most firms have between 1 and 10 employees, and only very few have IS departments with more than 
100 employees. The percentage of their total budget allocated by firms to IS tends to be quite low too:  
most firms dedicate between 0 and 4% of their budgets to IS, and only very few dedicate more than to 
11% to this department, the maximum budget percentage allocated to IS being 30% (we must point 
out that the question referring to the percentage of the budget dedicated to IS was the least answered 
one in the whole survey, which means that answers or results regarding this aspect must be treated 
with caution). In short, both the IS department staff size and the budget percentage dedicated to this 
function prove that, regardless of firm size, only few human and/or financial resources are assigned to 
these areas. 
4.2 Outsourcing risks 
Table 3 shows the risks involved in IS outsourcing. We must say that, in the corresponding question,  
and following the lines of previous studies (Collins and Millen, 1995:9), interviewees were asked to 
specify the three risks they considered to be the most important out of a list that had previously been 
given to them. That list was based on the review of the literature presented in section 2 of this paper1. 
Dichotomic variables consequently appeared, with a zero value when a specific risk was not 
mentioned and a one value when it was. N stands for the number of times interviewees placed a 
particular risk among the three most important ones.  
The excessive dependence on the provider this contract may generate is very clearly identified as the 
main obstacle. Other relevant -although much less often mentioned- drawbacks are the possible loss of 
competence on the part of the customer and the dubious qualification level of the provider’s staff. 
Curiously, the last problem in order of importance is the provider’s inability to adapt to new 
                                                 
1 The order in which we presented the said risks in section 2 is identical to the ranking shown in Table 3, which makes it easier to establish a 
relationship between the theoretical review and the results obtained. 
technologies. In other words, doubts do not refer to technical aspects, but to the provider’s personal 
(human) characteristics. Another relatively surprising result has to do with the fact that the potential 
opposition of the IS service staff is one of the least valued risks, even though the outsourcing contract 
may put those employees’ jobs in danger. 
 
Risks N % valid Rank 
An excessive dependence on the provider 
Loss of critical skills and competences 
Qualification of the provider’s staff 
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract 
Unclear cost-benefit relationship 
Hidden costs in the contract 
Security issues 
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision 
Possible IS staff opposition 































Table 3. Outsourcing risks. 
We then carried out another series of tests which sought to clarify whether or not these risks were 
closely related to firm characteristics. In first place, and regarding the relationship between 
outsourcing level and outsourcing risks, we can identify three risks that are unarguably dependent on 
outsourcing level (see Table 4). 
• The firms that outsource the most are also the ones that most fear the possible dependence on the 
provider generated by outsourcing. 
• The firms that outsource the most are also the ones that most fear the IS staff’s possible 
opposition. 
• They are also the most concerned about the potential security problems outsourcing may generate. 
  
  Outsourcing level    
  Below the 
mean 
Above the 
mean Total Chi-square Sign. 
No 61 (52.1%) 56 (47.9%) 117 (100%)An excessive dependence 
on the provider Yes 63 (33.3%) 126 (66.7%) 189 (100%) 10.601 0.001 
No 123 (43.3%) 161 (56.7%) 284 (100%)Possible IS staff 
opposition Yes 1   (4.5%) 21 (95.5%) 22 (100%) 12.730 0.000 
No 105 (43.2%) 138 (56.8%) 243 (100%)Security issues 
Yes 19 (30.2%) 44 (69.8%) 63 (100%) 3.536 0.060* 
Hidden costs in the contract 
Provider’s staff qualification 
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract 
Inability to adapt to new technologies 
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision 
Loss of critical skills and competences 
















Table 4. Chi-square test: outsourcing level and outsourcing risks. 
As for the influence of size on outsourcing risks, we firstly tried to see to what extent the number of 
employees in the firm has a bearing on the development of those risks. We detected quite a few 
statistical dependence relationships. Thus, firms with higher numbers of workers showed more 
concern about the qualification of the providing firm’s staff, about the possible opposition to 
outsourcing of their IS department’s staff, and finally about the unclear relationship between costs and 
benefits. In contrast, firms with fewer workers were above all concerned about dependence on the 
provider and potential security problems (see Table 5). 
 
 
  Staff    
  Up to 500 From 500 Total Chi-square Sign. 
No 132 (67.3%) 64 (32.7%) 196 (100%)Provider’s staff 
qualification  Yes 58 (52.7%) 52 (47.3%) 110 (100%) 6.398 0.011 
No 58 (49.6%) 59 (50.4%) 117 (100%)An excessive dependence 
on the provider  Yes 132 (60.8%) 57 (30.2%) 189 (100%) 12.613 0.000 
No 184 (64.8%) 100 (35.2%) 284 (100%)Possible IS staff 
opposition  Yes 6 (27.3%) 16 (72.7%) 22 (100%) 12.209 0.000 
No 144 (59.3%) 99 (40.7%) 243 (100%)Security issues  
 Yes 46 (73.0%) 17 (27.0%) 63 (100%) 4.022 0.045 
No 144 (67.9%) 68 (32.1%) 212 (100%)Unclear cost-benefit 
relationship Yes 46 (48.9%) 48 (51.1%) 94 (100%) 9.976 0.002 
Hidden costs in the contract  
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract  
Inability to adapt to new technologies  
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision  











Table 5. Chi-square test: staff and outsourcing risks. 
 
We also identified some dependence relationships between the most frequent outsourcing risks and 
firm sales (see Table 6). Firms with the highest sales are the ones which most fear the loss of critical 
skills and competences, as well as the potential opposition of their staff. Instead, those with lower 
sales are mostly concerned about the hidden costs of outsourcing contracts and the excessive 
dependence on the provider. Therefore, the group of smaller firms (in terms of staff volume and sales) 
especially fear excessive dependence on the provider, while greater firms show reluctance to outsource 
due to their staff’s opposition. 
 
  Sales    
  Up to 15* From 15* Total Chi-square Sign. 
No 89 (41.2%) 127 (58.8%) 216 (100%)Hidden costs in the 
contract  Yes 58 (64.4%) 32 (35.6%) 90 (100%) 13.747 0.000 
No 47 (40.2%) 70 (59.8%) 117 (100%)An excessive dependence 
on the provider  Yes 100 (52.9%) 89 (47.1%) 189 (100%) 4.698 0.030 
No 103 (53.1%) 91 (46.9%) 194 (100%)Loss of critical skills and 
competences  Yes 44 (39.3%) 68 (60.7%) 112 (100%) 5.423 0.020 
No 142 (50.0%) 142 (50.0%) 284 (100%)Possible IS staff 
opposition  Yes 5 (22.7%) 17 (77.3%) 22 (100%) 6.084 0.014 
Provider’s staff qualification 
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract 
Inability to adapt to new technologies 
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision 
Security issues 














Table 6. Chi-square test: sales and outsourcing risks. 
Outsourcing risks are the same for the different firms, regardless of the sector they belong to, as we 
can see in Table 7. However, Table 8 shows that while firms with fewer staff in their IS department 
are the ones that most fear an excessive dependence on the provider, those with a higher number of 
employees are above all worried about the risk of losing critical skills and competences in their IS 
department and about the unclear relationship between costs and benefits in IS outsourcing. 
 
 Chi-square Sing. 
Hidden costs in the contract 
Provider’s staff qualification 
An excessive dependence on the provider 
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract 
Inability to adapt to new technologies 
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision 
Loss of critical skills and competences 
Possible IS staff opposition 
Security issues 





















Table 7. Chi-square test: sector and outsourcing risks. 
 
  IS Staff    
  Up to 5 From 5 Total Chi-square Sign. 
No 35 (31.0%) 78 (69.0%) 113 (100%)An excessive dependence 
on the provider  Yes 87 (48.3%) 93 (51.7%) 180 (100%) 8.609 0.003 
No 86 (46.0%) 101 (54.0%) 187 (100%)Loss of critical skills and 
competences Yes 36 (34.0%) 70 (66.0%) 106 (100%) 4.027 0.045 
No 93 (45.8%) 110 (54.2%) 203 (100%)Unclear cost-benefit 
relationship Yes 29 (32.2%) 61 (67.8%) 90 (100%) 4.739 0.029 
Hidden costs in the contract 
Provider’s staff qualification 
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract 
Inability to adapt to new technologies 
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision 
















Table 8. Chi-square test: IS staff and outsourcing risks. 
Finally, after studying the relationships between outsourcing risks and the percentage of its total 
budget each firm allocates to IS, we checked that no statistical relationship exists; in other words, risks 
are not directly related to that budget percentage, as can be verified in Table 9. 
 
 Chi-square Sign. 
Hidden costs in the contract 
Provider’s staff qualification 
An excessive dependence on the provider 
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract 
Inability to adapt to new technologies 
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision 
Loss of critical skills and competences 
Possible IS staff opposition 
Security issues 





















Table 9. Chi-square test: Budget percentage allocated to IS  and outsourcing risks. 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
IS outsourcing has become a widespread phenomenon worldwide, and is also very common among 
large Spanish firms. Despite their large size (in terms of both sales and staff), and judging by the staff 
volume of IS departments and the budget percentage allocated to IS activities, these firms do not 
dedicate many resources to IS services. 
The main obstacle mentioned by the largest Spanish firms in relation to IS outsourcing is the excessive 
dependence on the provider this type of contract may generate. Other important fears, although less 
significant than the previous one, would be the loss of competence the customer may suffer and the 
dubious qualification of the provider’s staff. Curiously enough, the risk ranked lowest in importance is 
the inability to adapt to new technologies, which suggests that doubts refer to providers’ personal or 
human characteristics rather than to their technical skills. Another surprising result is the low ranking 
for possible IS staff opposition, which clearly contrasts with the importance given to this factor in the 
literature. 
Nevertheless, we can find an explanation if we relate these risks to some of the characteristics of the 
interviewed firms and their IS departments. Thus, it can be seen that the most important problem 
involved in outsourcing (excessive dependence on the provider) is mainly associated with the firms 
that outsource the most, are smaller (both in terms of sales and staff) and have fewer IS staff, whereas 
larger firms outsourcing the most are particularly concerned about their own staff ’s opposition to this 
type of contract. In the former case, it seems reasonable for smaller firms to have objections to this 
potential dependence, since they have not so many resources available to abandon the provider and 
look for other alternatives (like the internal reconstruction of their own IS department or the search for 
new providers). In the latter case, it could be argued that firms which outsource the most and are  
larger in size fear the opposition of their staff due to the large number of employees that might be 
affected by outsourcing. 
As for the loss of skills and competences, the risk ranked second in importance, it is the most frequent 
among firms with more resources (in terms of sales and IS staff), which would mean that these firms’ 
most important concern is their own incompetence after outsourcing is introduced. On the other hand, 
we can say that although there is clear evidence that outsourcing risks are determined by both 
outsourcing level and certain characteristics related to firm size (sales, number of employees and IS 
staff), it is also true that other characteristics, such as the activity sector or the budget percentage 
allocated to IS, do not condition those risks. 
Finally, we must point out that the outsourcing risks described in this paper should be taken into 
account, both in business practice and in future theoretical developments, since all of them have found 
some support, at least in the firms we have analysed. In order to reduce those risks, IS managers 
should consider the possibility of not resorting to total outsourcing, choosing instead either selective 
outsourcing or a multiple-provider approach, or even both at the same time. Another interesting 
alternative would consist in the IS department’s facing up to outsourcing providers’ offers with a 
benchmarking study. In any case, firms must be aware of the need to retain some specific key 
knowledge in house if they really want the outsourcing relationship to work satisfactorily for the 
customer.  
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